The former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) IT specialist previously accused of trying to pass secret and top-secret information to foreign spies has pleaded guilty following a successful FBI sting.
Nathan Vilas Laatsch, then 28, and now 29, was arrested in May 2025 after an undercover FBI agent caught him for the second time transmitting intelligence packages in a public park that he believed would be collected by a foreign government’s spy.
The man, who had been employed at the DIA as a civilian employee since 2019, held top-secret clearance, and in March 2025 offered to transmit classified information to an overseas administration.
The identity of this country has never been revealed, but court documents [PDF] describe it as “a friendly foreign government.”
Laatsch was assigned to the DIA’s Insider Threat Division in “spring 2025,” a unit dedicated to identifying government workers who were likely to leak, or already were leaking, classified information to foreign powers.
According to the Justice Department, the FBI “became aware” of Laatsch’s offer in March.
The man’s initial email, sent from a newly created account, had the subject line: “Outreach from USA Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Officer.”
The email introduced Laatsch, his role at the DIA, and the service he was willing to provide. According to the complaint, Laatsch served in a technical role in support of the DIA's internal Office of Security (SEC). Among other things, his duties included "enabling user activity monitoring on individuals with access to DIA systems, including individuals who are under investigation" and "assisting external partners, such as law enforcement, on the use of insider threat tools."
“I am willing to share classified information that I have access to, which are completed intelligence products, some unprocessed intelligence, and other assorted classified documentation,” the email stated.
The email included a picture of his government ID used to enter and exit his Washington, D.C. workplace, with name and image redacted, and a username associated with an encrypted messaging platform the recipient could use to continue the conversation.
Soon after Laatsch’s email was intercepted, the FBI instigated an undercover operation to trick the IT bod into thinking that he was talking to a genuine spy.
The feds’ efforts were not immediately successful. Agents replied on March 23, saying: “Good afternoon, I received your message and share your concerns. We are glad you reached out. I look forward to your response and learning more about your work.”
Laatsch did not respond until April 14, after the FBI sent a follow-up via the original email address on April 4.
Following additional conversations, in which Laatsch described what information he was offering to the "foreign spy," on April 28, 2025, Laatsch entered his office and within 20 minutes began accessing classified information.
Prosecutors said he spent much of the entire workday writing on a physical notepad while intermittently looking at his computer monitor, hiding the notebook when coworkers walked by.
“The defendant wrote multiple pages of notes, which he then removed from the notepad at his desk and folded into squares,” court documents state. “At the end of his workday, the defendant bent under his desk, placed the folded papers into his socks, and departed the office.”
Laatsch repeated the same behavior on April 29, and again on April 30, only this time placing the paper squares in the bottom of his lunchbox.
The next day, the IT specialist followed FBI instructions on where to dead-drop the thumb drive - onto which he had transposed state secrets - in an Arlington, Virginia park.
Although he believed he was leaving the device for a foreign spy to collect, the FBI instead gathered Laatsch’s deposit and found nine typed documents, eight of which contained information classified as top-secret and contained sensitive compartmented information.
Court documents confirmed that the nature of the files Laatsch transmitted included sensitive methods of intelligence collection, intelligence related to foreign military exercises, and analysis of the impact of those military exercises.
These were chosen entirely by Laatsch, who had not received a brief on what files to collect from the FBI. In exchanged messages, Laatsch stated he chose the files based on assumed interests.
The device also contained a note from Laatsch personally. In it, he said he hoped the initial tranche of files would serve as proof of the type of information to which he had access.
Laatsch, whom prosecutors described as an individual who had become disenchanted with the current administration, also expressed his willingness to accept citizenship in the foreign nation.
Further, he said he was “not opposed to other compensation,” but was not in need of financial or other kinds of material rewards.
In the interim, Laatsch messaged the "spy" with additional details about how internal investigations are carried out at the DIA, the common “stupid mistakes” made by those under investigation, and that they “should not be too difficult” for him to avoid.
The undercover FBI agent arranged a second intel drop for the following month, to which Laatsch agreed.
According to the plea agreement, between May 15 and May 27, Laatsch would enter his workplace, log into his classified system, and spend most of the day transcribing classified information by hand into a notebook. He repeatedly folded up the pages and placed them in his socks before leaving at the end of the workday.
The FBI arranged the second intel drop for May 29, 2025. It instructed Laatsch to instead head to a specific picnic table in the same Arlington park and electronically transfer the files from his personal computer while situated at the picnic table.
Laatsch agreed, executed the transfer to the FBI-controlled address while sitting in the park, and was arrested on the spot.
The man waived his right to an attorney and admitted to the offenses when questioned by FBI agents.
“By his own admission, Laatsch betrayed his oath by offering classified information to a foreign government, the very thing he was supposed to prevent as an employee of DIA’s Insider Threat Division,” said Roman Rozhavsky, assistant director at the FBI’s Counterintelligence and Espionage Division.
“Those entrusted with our nation’s most sensitive information must not exploit their access for personal gain - in this case offering to sell American secrets to buy foreign citizenship. The FBI and our partners will continue to hold accountable all those who betray the trust of the American people.”
Laatsch’s plea agreement [PDF] recommends a sentence between 11 and 18 years, including time served, although the court is able to issue a maximum sentence that includes a life term and a $250,000 fine. ®
